Evelyn A. Muir v. Amex Life Assurance Company, a California corporation; Sandra M. Jenkins; Linda J. Muir; Virginia M. Lowe; Deanna M. Pfeiffer; and Mark W. Muir : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Evelyn A. Muir v. Amex Life Assurance Company, a
California corporation; Sandra M. Jenkins; Linda J.
Muir; Virginia M. Lowe; Deanna M. Pfeiffer; and
Mark W. Muir : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David H. Scwobe, Esq; Mark C. McLachlan, Esq; Perkins, Schwobe & McLachlan; Attorneys for
Appellant.
B. Ray Zoll, Esq; Tom D. Branch, Esq; Zoll & Branch; Attorneys for Respondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation









° O A A A 
DOCKET NO. y f O ^ 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation; 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J. 
MUIR; VIRGINIA M. LOWE; 
DEANNA M. PFEIFFER; and 
MARK W. MUIR, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
Case No. 890342-CA 
Mb 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
David H. Schwobe, Esq. 
Mark C. McLachlan, Esq. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0177 
B. Ray Zoll, Esq. 
Tom D. Branch, Esq. 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
Attorneys for Respondents 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 




AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation; 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J. 
MUIR; VIRGINIA M. LOWE; 
DEANNA M. PFEIFFER; and 
MARK W. MUIR, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
Case No. 890342-CA 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
David H. Schwobe, Esq. 
Mark C. McLachlan, Esq. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0177 
B. Ray Zoll, Esq. 
Tom D. Branch, Esq. 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
Attorneys for Respondents 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
ARGUMENT 11 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
INTO EVIDENCE HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE DECEDENT TO 
RESPONDENTS 11 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING 
THE INSURANCE POLICY SOLELY IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION , 17 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE INTENT OF THE DECEDENT WAS 
MANIFEST FROM THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE 
INSURANCE ENROLLMENT FORM 19 
POINT IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO ALLOW APPELLANT, AS PREPARER OF THE 
INSURANCE ENROLLMENT FORM, TO TESTIFY 
AS TO WHAT SHE INTENDED THE WORDS UPON 
THE ENROLLMENT FORM TO MEAN 19 
POINT V. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY 
OF THE DECEDENT'S BISHOP CONCERNING 
OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING THE PER-
FORMANCE OF HIS ECCLESIASTICAL DUTIES 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING CROSS 
EXAMINATION CONCERNING HYPNOTIC 




POINT VII. THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE 




CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 29 
Authorities and Cases Cited 
Briaas v. Liddell 
699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985) 17 
Carneseca. yt Carnesegfl 
572 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah 1977) 12 
Crowther v. Carter 
767 P.2d 129 (Ut. App. 1989) 23 
Duty v. Ignasiak 
633 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App. 1982) . . . . . . . . 17 
Erion v. Timken Co. 
368 N.E.2d 312 (Ct. App. Ohio 1976) 11 
Estate of Baker 
182 Cal.Rptr. 550 (1982) 27 
Estate of Severns 
350 N.W.2d 865 (Neb. 1984) 13 
Evans v. Volunteers of America 
280 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1955) 20 
Hultouist v. Ring 
301 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App. 1957) 20 
Jones v. Department of Human Resources 
310 S.E.2d 753 (Ga. App. 1983) 22 
Kabbaz v. Prudential Ins. Co. 
502 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio App. 1985) 18 
Key Life Ins. Co. v. Byrd 
312 So.2d 450 (Miss. 1975) 11 
Maughn v. Maughn 
102 UAR 44 (Ut. App. 1989) 23 
- ii -
Page 
McCravy v. McCravy 
260 S.E.2d 52 (Ga. 1979) 11 
McFadden v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. 
41 A.2d 624 (Penn. 1945) 18 
Michell v. Tove Bros. Yellow Cab Co. 
174 So.2d 168 (La. App. 1965) 11 
NQrd^und, yT Nordlyn^ 
452 N.E.2d 18 (111. App. 1983) 11 
Oates v. Hodae 
713 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App. 1986) 18 
Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts 
768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1989) 19-23 
Reich v. W.F. Hall Printing Co. 
361 N.E.2d 296 (111. App. 1977) 18 
Spencer v. Gutierrez 
663 P.2d 371 (N.M. App. 1983) 20 
Spryncznatyk v. General Motors Corp. 
771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985) 23 
Standard Life Insurance Company of the South v. Franks 
260 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1972) 25 
State v. Butler 
560 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah 1977) 12-14 
State v. Grueber 
110 UAR 29 (Utah 1989) 27 
State v. Tuttle 
106 UAR 6 (Utah 1989) 22 
Transamerica Occidental Life v. Burke 
368 S.E.2d 301 (W.V. 1988) 17 
U.Sf vt PonticeUi 
622 F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 1980) 12 
- iii 
Pj&e 
Wheaton Nat'l Bank v. Aarvold 
N.E.2d 520 (111. App. 1976) 18 
Western Kane Cty Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co. 
744 P.2d 1376 (Ut. 1987) 24 
Willed v. Darrfrfr 
68 S.W. 1023 (Mo. 1902) 18-2 
Wirtanen v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America 
183 N.W.2d 456 (Mich. App. 1971) 22 
Woodson v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. 
5 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1942) 18 
29 Am.Jur., Evidence, Section 496 11 
44 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance, Section 1701 17 
80 Am.Jur.2d, Wills, Section 1354 20 
ADDENDUM A: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order of Judgment 
- iv -
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
David H. Schwobe (#2893) 
Mark C. McLachlan (#2207) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0177 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * 
EVELYN A. MUIR, : 
Plaintiff/ : 
Appellant/ 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. 
AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation; : 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J. 
MUIR; VIRGINIA M. LOWE; : Case No. 890342-CA 
DEANNA M. PFEIFFER; and 
MARK W. MUIR, : 
Defendants/ : 
Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2(a)-3(2)(j) and Rule 
4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. This Appeal was 
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of 
Appeals on May 24, 1989. 
Plaintiff commenced this action on February 23, 1987, 
seeking a determination as to the ownership of proceeds under a 
policy of accidental life insurance. On or about January 18, 
1988, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, Defendant Amex Life 
Assurance Company paid the full amount of the insurance proceeds 
into Court, and was subsequently dismissed as a party from this 
action. 
Trial in this action was held in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, before the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup, District Court Judge, on January 17, 18, 19 and 
24, 1989. On March 16, 1989, the Trial Court entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Judgment, in 
which the Court found that the intent of the Decedent was 
manifest from the express terms of the insurance enrollment form, 
and that such intent was that the Plaintiff and Defendants be 
joint, rather than primary and contingent beneficiaries under the 
insurance policy. Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 11, 12. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are as follows: 
1. Did the District Court err in overruling 
Appellant's objections to hearsay statements allegedly made by 
the Decedent to the Respondents? 
2. Did the District Court err in construing the 
insurance policy solely in accordance with principles of contract 
construction? 
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3 . Did the D i s t r i c t Court e r r in f ind ing tha t the 
in tent of the Decedent was manifest from the express terms of the 
insurance enrollment form? 
4. Did the D i s t r i c t Court err in refusing to allow 
Appe l l an t , as p r e p a r e r of the insurance enro l lment form, to 
t e s t i f y as to what she intended the words upon the form to mean? 
5. Did the Cour t e r r in o v e r r u l i n g A p p e l l a n t f s 
objection of p r iv i l ege and allowing Decedent fs Bishop to t e s t i f y 
concerning o b s e r v a t i o n s made dur ing the performance of h i s 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l dut ies? 
6. Did the D i s t r i c t Court err in excluding questioning 
as to whether Respondent Lowe had been hypnotized in r e l a t i on to 
her testimony? 
7 . Was t h e f i n d i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t Cour t , t h a t 
the Decedent intended the insurance proceeds to be e q u a l l y 
divided among the Appellant and the Respondents, contrary to the 
evidence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves a dispute as to the ownership of 
proceeds under a policy of accidental life insurance upon the 
life of the Decedent, Wallace A. Muir. 
On or about October 28, 1978, the Decedent executed a form 
for enrollment in a credit union accident insurance program with 
a death benefit in the sum of Thirty-one Thousand Dollars 
($31,000.00). Except for the signature of the Decedent, the 
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entire enrollment form was filled out by the Appellant in her 
handwriting, during a conversation with the Decedent, which 
occurred immediately prior to the Decedent's execution of the 
enrollment form. The enrollment form contains a small space 
for designation of beneficiary, wherein the Appellant wrote, at 
the direction of the Decedent, her own first name, followed by a 
dash, then followed by the first names of the five (5) 
Respondents, who are children of the Appellant and the Decedent. 
On December 26, 1984, the Decedent, pursuant to a 
solicitation from his credit union, executed a Benefit Increase 
Request form, increasing his benefits under the insurance plan to 
the sum of One Hundred Fifty-one Thousand Dollars ($151,000.00). 
No change or clarification in beneficiary designation was made at 
that time. 
On September 5, 1986, the Decedent died from an accidental 
dynamite blast in Duchesne County, Utah. Subsequent to the 
Decedent's death, the insurer, Amex Life Assurance Company, 
refused to pay the proceeds on the insurance policy to the 
Appellant unless the Respondents would execute releases of any 
claims they might have to the proceeds. Respondents' refusal to 
execute such releases caused Appellant to commence the present 
action on February 23, 1987. 
On January 24, 1989, following the trial in this action, the 
Trial Court ruled from the bench that the intent of the Decedent 
was manifest from the express terms of the insurance enrollment 
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form, and was that Appellant and Respondents be joint, rather 
than primary and contingent, beneficiaries under the insurance 
policy. It is from this Ruling that the present Appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Appellant and the Decedent were married on April 
26, 1947 and resided together continuously as husband and wife 
until the date of the Decedentfs death on September 5, 1986 
(R. 25-26). 
2. Respondents are children of Appellant and Decedent. 
3. On October 28, 1978, the Decedent executed a form 
for enrollment in a credit union accident insurance program with 
a death benefit in the sum of Thirty-one Thousand Dollars 
($31,000.00) (Plaintifffs Exhibit 1, received at R.29). 
4. The designation of beneficiary upon said enrollment 
form is ambiguous as to whether the Appellant and Respondents 
were intended by the Decedent to be joint or primary and 
contingent beneficiaries. 
5. All portions of said enrollment form, except for 
the signature of the Decedent, were filled out by Appellant in 
her handwriting, during a conversation with the Decedent on 
October 28, 1978, immediately prior to the Decedentfs execution 
of the enrollment form (R. 68-75). 
6. At the time that said enrollment form was executed, two 
of the Respondents were minors and were living at home, the other 
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Respondents having been emancipated and living away from home 
(R. 30,37-38) . 
7. At the time that said enrollment form was executed, the 
Decedent replaced an existing policy of life insurance with the 
subject policy, leaving the subject policy as the Decedent's sole 
life insurance coverage (R. 71, 78). 
8. At the time that said enrollment form was executed, a 
mortgage in the approximate amount of Twenty-seven Thousand 
Dollars ($27,000.00) was owed upon the home of Appellant and the 
Decedent with only Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) equity 
in said home (R. 57, 110). 
9. At the time that said enrollment form was executed, the 
Appellant had suffered from a long period of serious health 
problems and was unemployed (R. 59-61). 
10. At the time that said enrollment form was executed, the 
Decedent and Appellant owned no other significant savings or 
investments (R. 59) . 
11. At the time that said enrollment form was executed, the 
Decedent and Appellant had been married for thirty-one (31) 
years (R. 25) . 
12. Subsequent to Decedentfs execution of the insurance 
enrollment form, all premiums thereunder were paid by checks 
issued by Appellant from funds jointly owned by Appellant 
and Decedent, or from funds in the credit union jointly owned by 
- 6 -
Decedent and Appel lan t ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exh ib i t 14, rece ived a t 
R.80) . 
1 3 . On December 26, 1984 the Decedent , pu r suan t to a 
s o l i c i t a t i o n from his c r ed i t union, increased his benef i ts under 
the insurance plan to the sum of One Hundred Fifty-one Thousand 
Dollars ($151,000.00). No change or c l a r i f i c a t i o n in beneficiary 
d e s i g n a t i o n was made a t t h a t time ( P l a i n t i f f ' s Exh ib i t 2, 
received at R.29). 
1 4 . On September 5 , 1986 t h e Decedent died from an 
accidental dynamite b l a s t in Duchesne County, Utah (R. 675) . 
1 5 . Subsequen t t o t h e D e c e d e n t ' s d e a t h , the i n s u r e r 
(Amex Life Assurance Company), refused to pay the proceeds of the 
insurance po l i cy to the Appellant unless the Respondents would 
execute re leases of any claims they might have to the proceeds 
(R. 342-344). 
16. Respondents subsequently refused to execute the re lease 
forms a l l o w i n g payment of t h e i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s to t h e 
P l a i n t i f f , which r e s u l t e d in the f i l i ng of the present action 
(R. 647-648). 
17. Although t h e r e was c o n f l i c t i n g tes t imony a t T r i a l 
concerning the closeness of the marr iage r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
Appellant and the Decedent, the evidence was undisputed that the 
Decedent cared grea t ly about the Appel lant ' s welfare and was a 
good provider (R. 136, 168-169, 193, 215-216). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I . 
The T r i a l Court e r red in admi t t ing i n t o ev idence , over 
P l a i n t i f f ' s object ion, hearsay testimony of the Respondents Linda 
J . Muir, Virginia M. Lowe and Mark W. Muir, r e l a t i ng to alleged 
conversations wherein the Decedent informed said Respondents tha t 
they were included within his insurance coverage. Such testimony 
was i nadmis s ib l e as an excep t ion to the hearsay rule because 
Responden t s p r o v i d e d no c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e of t h e 
t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s of such tes t imony and because the a l l eged 
conversations did not occur contemporaneously with the execution 
of the insurance e n r o l l m e n t , did not c l e a r l y r e l a t e to the 
insurance p o l i c y which i s a t i s sue in t h i s a c t i o n , and were 
not probative as to whether Respondents were intended as j o in t or 
contingent b e n e f i c i a r i e s . 
POINT I I . 
The Trial Court erred in construing the insurance policy 
strictly in accordance with principles of contract construction, 
inasmuch as a life insurance policy is quasi testamentary in 
nature, and requires greater deference to the subjective intent 
of the Decedent than in the case of a common contract. 
POINT III. 
The Trial Court erred in holding that the express terms of 
the beneficiary designation manifest the intent of the Decedent, 
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and in requiring Appellant to, in effect, overcome a presumption 
that Respondents were intended as joint beneficiaries. Appellant 
submits that the beneficiary designation is ambiguous as a matter 
of law, and that the Trial Court improperly imposed a greater 
burden upon Appellant than upon Respondents. 
POINT IV. 
The Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Appellant, as the 
preparer of the insurance enrollment form, to testify as to what 
she intended the beneficiary designation to mean. A scrivener 
may testify as to the meaning of facially ambiguous language used 
by the scrivener in expressing the intent of the Decedent. Such 
testimony is highly relevant in determining the intent of the 
Decedent as such intent is manifest within the written 
instrument. 
POINT V. 
The Trial Court erred in allowing the Decedent's Bishop to 
testify as to observations which he made within the scope of his 
ecclesiastical duties. The clergyman's privilege extends to 
observations of a confidential nature which are made during the 
performance of the clergymanfs official functions. The Trial 
Court applied an unduly narrow construction of the privilege in 
the present case. In the alternative, the Trial Court erred in 
excluding testimony as to the Decedent's explanation of his 
conduct, inasmuch as such exclusion was inconsistent with the 
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Courtfs admission of the clergyman's observation and was unfairly 
prejudicial to Appellant. 
POINT VI. 
The Tr ia l Court erred in excluding cross-examination as to 
whether Respondent Lowe's testimony was hypnotical ly influenced. 
The dubious q u a l i t y of h y p n o t i c a l l y "enhanced" tes t imony i s 
widely recognized. Appel lant ' s inquiry into Lowe's c r e d i b i l i t y 
was p o t e n t i a l l y prejudiced by the exclusion of such quest ioning. 
POINT VII . 
The c lear weight of the evidence was contrary to the Tr ia l 
Cour t ' s determinat ion. The re l a t ionsh ip between the Decedent and 
the Appellant, t he i r f inancia l c i r c u m s t a n c e s , and t h a t of the 
Respondents, a t the time tha t the pol icy was executed, as well as 
Appel lant ' s pa r t i c i pa t i on in f i l l i n g out the insurance enrollment 
form, and A p p e l l a n t ' s tes t imony as to the Deceden t ' s d i r e c t 
s t a t emen t s of i n t e n t , a l l weigh a g a i n s t t h e T r i a l C o u r t ' s 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n . The only evidence in suppor t of Respondents 
included t he i r unsuccessful attempt to impugn the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between the Appe l lan t and the Decedent , and the se l f - serv ing 
hearsay testimony of Respondents Linda J . Muir, Virginia M. Lowe 
and Mark W. Muir. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I . 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE DECEDENT TO RESPONDENTS 
Under t h e Utah Ru le s of E v i d e n c e , h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s of a 
D e c e d e n t f s i n t e n t may a r g u a b l y be a d m i s s i b l e unde r one o r more of 
t h r e e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e : Rule 803(3) , Rule 803(24) , 
and R u l e 8 0 4 ( b ) ( 5 ) . See E r i o n v . T imken C o . , 368 N.E.2d 312 
( C t . App. Ohio 1976) ( a p p l y i n g t h e s u b s t a n t i a l l y s i m i l a r O h i o 
R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e ) . H o w e v e r , n o t a l l s u c h s t a t e m e n t s a r e 
a d m i s s i b l e . In f a c t # t h e c o u r t s have b e e n r e l u c t a n t t o a d m i t 
h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y of a d e c e d e n t f s s t a t e m e n t s u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l 
e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e . Nordlund v . N o r d l u n d , 452 N.E.2d 
1 8 ( 1 1 1 . A p p . 1 9 8 3 ) ; M c C r a v y v . M c C r a v y . 260 S . E . 2 d 52 
( G a . 1 9 7 9 ) ; K e y L i ^ e I n ? t C Q , v . B y r 3 , 3 1 2 S o . 2 d 4 5 0 
( M i s s . 1 9 7 5 ) ; M i c h e l l v . Toye B r o s . Yel low Cab C o . , 174 So .2d 168 
( L a . A p p . 1 9 6 5 ) . To be a d m i s s i b l e , t h e h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t must 
c l e a r l y r e l a t e t o t h e i s s u e fo r which i t i s o f f e r e d a s e v i d e n c e . 
N o r d l u n d v . N o r d l u n d , s u p r a a t 2 2 . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t s 
g e n e r a l l y r e q u i r e s o m e i n d e p e n d e n t c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f 
t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s f o r s u c h t e s t i m o n y t o b e a d m i s s i b l e . E r i o n , 
368 N.E.2d a t 3 1 6 ; 29 A m . J u r . , E v i d e n c e , S e c t i o n 4 9 6 . 
The U t a h Supreme C o u r t i m p l i c i t l y a p p l i e d t h e f o r e g o i n g 
p r i n c i p l e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y of a 
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u e c e d e n t ' s s ta tements in Carneseca v. Carneseca, 572 P.2d 708, 
711 (Utah 1977) , wherein the Court held that hearsay testimony of 
an o r a l a g r e e m e n t f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of r e a l p r o p e r t y was 
admissible for the purpose of e s t a b l i s h i n g a cons truc t ive t r u s t . 
The Defendants1 object ion to such test imony, based upon the dead 
man s t a t u t e , was rejected by the Court: 
In the i n s t a n t case there were four wi tnesses to the 
t ransact ion , and in a d d i t i o n , the t r i a l c o u r t found 
Bernice herse l f was present . That, together with the 
other e v i d e n c e c o r r o b o r a t e s t h e t r u s t a g r e e m e n t . 
Consequent ly , even i f some of the evidence may have 
been i n a d m i s s i b l e t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to 
s u s t a i n the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the t r i a l court that a 
construct ive t rus t e x i s t e d . (Footnote omitted.) 
The dead man s t a t u t e has subsequently been superseded by the Utah 
Rules of Ev idence , Laws 1984 , Ch. 35 , S e c . 1 . The Rules of 
E v i d e n c e s p e c i f i c a l l y r e q u i r e " e q u i v a l e n t c i r c u m s t a n t i a l 
guarantees of t rus twor th ines s ." Utah Rules of E v i d e n c e , Rule 
804(6) (s) . 
The courts have considered a number of factors in 
determining whether a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness 
exists to allow admission of hearsay testimony of a decedent's 
statements, including the contemporaneousness of the statement to 
the event which it purports to describe, State v. Butler, 560 
P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah 1977) , and any cause or motive for the 
declarant to be mistaken or untruthful. U.S. v. Ponticelli, 622 
F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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C a s e s i n v o l v i n g h e a r s a y d e c l a r a t i o n s of a D e c e d e n t f s 
i n t e n t r a i s e i s s u e s of b o t h t h e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s of t h e 
d e c l a r a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s and the c r e d i b i l i t y of the p r e s e n t 
w i t n e s s . E s t a t e of S e v e r n s , 350 N.W.2d 865 (Neb. 1 9 8 4 ) . 
However, in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the hearsay 
s t a t e m e n t , o n l y t h e former i s taken i n t o a c c o u n t . 1^. at 
869. 
In t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h r e e of the Respondents , Linda 
J . Muir, V irg ina M. Lowe and Mark W. Muir, were a l l o w e d t o 
t e s t i f y , over P l a i n t i f f ' s o b j e c t i o n s , as to c e r t a i n hearsay 
statements of the Decedent which, as construed by Respondents , 
r e l a t e to the i s s u e of the Decedent's intent that Respondents 
be b e n e f i c i a r i e s under t h e s u b j e c t i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . In 
par t i cu lar : 
1. Mark W. Muir t e s t i f i e d that , sometime during the summer 
of 1984 , he asked t h e D e c e d e n t i f t h e D e c e d e n t had l i f e 
insurance, to which the Decedent repl ied "Yes." The Respondent 
then a l l e g e d l y asked the Decedent, "Is my name on there?" To 
which the Decedent a l l eged ly responded, "Yes, t h e r e ' s something 
for you." (R. 375) . 
Appe l lant submits t h a t t h i s t e s t imony should have been 
excluded as i n a d m i s s i b l e h e a r s a y . There i s no i n d e p e n d e n t 
guarantee of trus tworth iness . Further, the a l leged statements 
were c l e a r l y not contemporaneous w i t h t h e s i g n i n g of t h e 
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insurance enrollment form, and were thus too remote for 
admission. State v. Butler, 560 P. 2d at 1139 (Utah 1977). 
Moreover, the alleged statements are of questionable relevance to 
the issue in this case. There is no evidence that the Decedent 
was referring specifically to the insurance policy which is 
involved in the present action. Undisputed evidence indicated 
that the Decedent maintained multiple insurance policies at times 
(R. 79-80, 397). Further, the alleged statements are not 
probative as to the issue of Respondents1 interest under the 
insurance policy vis-a-vis the Appellant. The Decedent may have 
been referring to the Respondents1 contingency interest under the 
policy, particularly in view of the Decedent's belief that he 
would outlive the Appellant. (Deposition of Evelyn A. Muir,' 
118:18-20 (Published at R. 93)). Under the circumstances, the 
alleged statements lack sufficient guarantee of relevance and 
trustworthiness to be admissible under the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. 
2. Linda J. Muir was permitted to testify concerning 
a conversation which allegedly occurred in about September of 
1985, wherein the Decedent allegedly stated that he had an 
insurance policy under which the Respondents were covered 
(R. 540, 567).1 
1
 Rule 803(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (Hearsay 
exception for "Then existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition") is not applicable to the testimony of Mark M. Muir or 
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This testimony should have been excluded as inadmissible 
hearsay. The statements were not contemporaneous with the 
execution of the insurance enrollment form and did not clearly 
relate to the insurance policy which is at issue. Further, the 
alleged statements are not probative as to whether Respondents1 
interest under the policy was primary or contingent. Further, 
the witness' testimony is vague and internally inconsistent. On 
direct examination, the witness testified that "He told me if 
anything ever happened to him, that there was a life insurance 
policy that wefre all covered in." (R. 540). However, in her 
Deposition, the witness testified: "He told me that there was -
should he die, that he had left provisions for myself and 
my brothers and sisters." (Deposition of Linda Joyce Muir, 
39:20-22 (Published at R. 566)). This testimony merely sets 
forth the witness1 understanding or opinion of the Decedent's 
meaning, and lacks the particularity which is necessary for the 
Court to ascertain the relevance and reliability of the alleged 
statement. 
3. Respondent Virginia M. Lowe testified at length 
concerning a conversation which she allegedly had with the 
Decedent concerning the subject insurance policy on the date that 
Linda J. Muir because the alleged declarations occurred long 
after the Decedent's execution of the insurance enrollment form, 
and were, at most, statements of memory or belief which are 
expressly not excluded under Rule 803(3). 
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the Decedent executed the enrollment form (R. 251-258, 430-433, 
4 3 6 - 4 3 7 ) . However , no c i r c u m s t a n t i a l g u a r a n t e e o f t h e 
t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s of such t e s t i m o n y was p r e s e n t e d . To the 
contrary, the circumstances re lated by t h i s witness were highly 
improbable. According to the w i t n e s s , the a l leged conversat ion 
took place in the Decedent fs home over a period of approximately 
two (2) hours. During t h i s t ime, Lowe and the Decedent a l l e g e d l y 
had an emotional and extended d i scuss ion concerning the insurance 
p o l i c y . Lowe t e s t i f i e d t h a t A p p e l l a n t was in and about the 
house during the a l l e g e d c o n v e r s a t i o n , and f i l l e d ou t t h e 
e n r o l l m e n t form, i n c l u d i n g the d e s i g n a t i o n of b e n e f i c i a r y 
(R. 253-258) . However, according to Lowe's test imony, Appellant 
took no part in the c o n v e r s a t i o n which a l l e g e d l y took place 
between the Decedent and Lowe concerning the b e n e f i c i a r i e s to the 
insurance po l i cy (R. 285) . 
I t i s h i g h l y improbable that the Appellant f i l l e d out the 
insurance enrollment form at the D e c e d e n t ' s d i r e c t i o n wi thout 
p a r t i c i p a t i n g in any c o n v e r s a t i o n which occurred between the 
Decedent and Lowe concern ing the i d e n t i t y or s t a t u s of the 
b e n e f i c i a r i e s . M o r e o v e r , Lowe ' s t e s t i m o n y c o n t a i n s no 
explanation of the dash, the presence of which i s undeniable, or 
o ther d e t a i l s of the insurance enro l lment form, such as the 
amount of the premiums, the D e c e d e n t ' s n a m e - s t i c k e r , or the 
Family Protect ion provis ion which the Decedent s e l e c t e d . 
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In considering the admissibility of Respondents1 hearsay 
testimony, a comparison of the testimony which was presented by 
the Appellant is illustrative• Unlike Respondents, Appellant's 
testimony is independently verified by Appellant's handwriting 
upon the enrollment form, and by detailed, specific testimony 
relating to the provisions of the enrollment form (R. 26-28)• 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING 
THE INSURANCE POLICY SOLELY IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION 
In construing the insurance enrollment form in the present 
case, the Trial Court applied general principles of contract 
construction, which emphasize the intent of the parties as 
expressed in the language of the agreement (R. 673-674) . While 
it has frequently been stated that life insurance policies are 
contractual in nature, Briggs v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770 (Utah 
1985), where the courts have had occasion to expound upon the 
principles relating to interpretation of an ambiguous designation 
of beneficiary in a life insurance policy, they have often 
applied principles relating to the construction of testamentary 
instruments. Transamerica Occidental Life v. Burke. 368 S.E.2d 
301 (W.V. 1988); Duty v. Ianasiak, 633 S.W.2d 654 
(Tex. App. 1982); 44 Am.Jur.2d, Insurance, Section 1701. This 
distinction is significant in the present case because, under the 
principles of testamentary construction, greater deference is 
provided to the subjective intent of the insured. TransAmerica 
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Occidental Life, 368 S.E.2d at 306; Oates v. Hodae, 713 S.W.2d 
361 (Tex. App. 1986); Wheaton Nat'l Bank v. Aarvold, 348 N.E.2d 
520 (111* App. 1976). Furtherf in relation to testamentary 
instruments/ extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish the 
existence of a latent ambiguity. Willard v. Darrah, 68 S.W. 1023 
(Mo. 1902) . Thus, the Trial Court should not have determined the 
primary beneficiary solely from the express language of the 
enrollment form# but was required to consider the entire 
circumstances surrounding the Decedent's designation of 
beneficiary. Reich v. W.F. Hall Printing Co., 361 N.E.2d 296 
(111. App. 1977)/ McFadden v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 41 
A.2d 624 (Penn. 1945); Woodson v. Provident Life & Accident 
Ins. Co., 5 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1942). As a result of such 
error, the Trial Court imposed a greater burden upon Plaintiff 
than was proper. The Trial Court required Appellant to overcome 
a presumption that Respondents were joint beneficiaries by virtue 
of their names appearing on the enrollment form (R.673-674) . 
Appellant submits that the burden of persuasion should have been 
borne equally be Appellant and Respondents/ inasmuch as the Trial 
Court was required to determine the identity of the beneficiary 
ab initio. Kabbaz v. Prudential Ins. Co., 501 N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 
App. 1985). 
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POINT I I I . 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE INTENT OF THE DECEDENT WAS MANIFEST 
FROM THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE INSURANCE ENROLLMENT FORM 
I t i s no t c l e a r from t h e r e c o r d w h e t h e r t h e T r i a l C o u r t 
a r r i v e d a t i t s c o n c l u s i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e D e c e d e n t ' s i n t e n t by 
examining the e n t i r e surrounding c i r c u m s t a n c e s or merely from i t s 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e b e n e f i c i a r y c l a u s e (R. 675; F i n d i n g s of 
F a c t , P a r a s . 1 1 , 1 2 ) . I f t h e T r i a l C o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n was 
b a s e d w h o l l y or p r e d o m i n a n t l y upon t h e e x p r e s s t e r m s of the 
b e n e f i c i a r y c l a u s e , A p p e l l a n t submits t h a t such d e t e r m i n a t i o n was 
e r r o n e o u s a s a m a t t e r o f l a w , inasmuch as the d e s i g n a t i o n of 
b e n e f i c i a r y i s f a c i a l l y ambiguous. The Court of Appeals does no t 
d e f e r t o a T r i a l C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g as t o t h e a m b i g u i t y o f a 
c o n t r a c t . P r o p e r t y A $ $ i ? t a n c e g o g p . v ? RQbertS/ 768 P.2d 976 
(Utah App. 1 9 8 9 ) . 
POINT IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW APPELLANT, 
AS PREPARER OF THE INSURANCE ENROLLMENT FORM, 
TO TESTIFY AS TO WHAT SHE INTENDED 
THE WORDS UPON THE ENROLLMENT FORM TO MEAN 
Appellantfs testimony concerning her intended meaning in 
designating the beneficiaries upon the enrollment form was 
excluded by the Court (R. 75). Such exclusion constituted 
error, because the testimony of a scrivener as to the meaning of 
ambiguous language used by the scrivener in expressing a 
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decedent 's in tent i s admiss ib le . Spencer v . Gut ierrez . 663 P.2d 
371 (N.M. App. 1 9 8 3 ) ; H u l t q u i s t v . R i n g . 301 S.W.2d 303 
(Tex. App. 1957); 80 Am.Jur.2d# W i l l s , Sect ion 1354. 
The purpose of such evidence i s not to vary the terms of the 
w i l l / but to reso lve a patent or l a t e n t ambiguity which appears 
w i t h i n the w i l l . Wi l lard v. Darrah. 68 So. at 1026. In such 
c a s e s , the testimony of the scrivener provides the most d i r e c t 
and p r o b a t i v e e v i d e n c e as to the meaning of the ambiguous 
c l a u s e . In Evans v . V o l u n t e e r s of America , 280 S.W.2d 1 
(Mo. 1 9 5 5 ) , the t e s t a t o r bequeathed c e r t a i n p o r t i o n s of h i s 
e s t a t e to "the VOLUNTEERS OF AMERICA, commonly known as the 
S a l v a t i o n Army. . . ." The V o l u n t e e r s of America and t h e 
S a l v a t i o n Army were, in f a c t , two separate e n t i t i e s . Thus, an 
ambiguity ex i s ted as to the i d e n t i t y of the b e n e f i c i a r y . I&. at 
4. In of fer ing the lower c o u r t ' s admission of oral and writ ten 
ins truc t ions to h i s attorney concerning preparation of the w i l l , 
the Missouri Supreme Court s t a t e d : 
Undoubtedly the most convincing evidence offered by the 
respondent was the l e t t e r of d i r e c t i o n s writ ten to the 
scrivener by t e s t a t r i x . Was t h i s admissible? For the 
purposes of t h i s case we can see no d i s t i n c t i o n between 
t h i s l e t t e r and the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence of oral 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . . . . A review of many cases has led us 
to the d e f i n i t e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t , under the law of 
M i s s o u r i and many o t h e r s t a t e s , e v i d e n c e o f a 
t e s t a t o r ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e s c r i v e n e r (under 
circumstances such as e x i s t in the i n s t a n t c a s e ) i s 
admiss ib le to a s s i s t in e s t a b l i s h i n g the intent ion of 
the t e s t a t o r as to the i d e n t i t y of a l ega tee under a 
descr ipt ion which i s equivocal and l a t e n t l y ambiguous. 
(Citat ions omitted.) 
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In the present case, Appellant, as the author of the 
ambiguous beneficiary clause at issue, should have been allowed 
to testify as to the meaning thereof* 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
TESTIMONY OF THE DECEDENT'S BISHOP 
CONCERNING OBSERVATIONS MADE DURING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF HIS ECCLESIASTICAL DUTIES 
The D i s t r i c t Court admitted i n t o e v i d e n c e , over A p p e l l a n t ' s 
o b j e c t i o n of p r i v i l e g e , t e s t i m o n y of the D e c e d e n t ' s Bishop t o the 
e f f e c t t h a t he had observed the Decedent on one o c c a s i o n wi th a 
woman o t h e r t h a n t h e A p p e l l a n t , during the performance of h i s 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l d u t i e s (R. 5 1 3 - 5 1 4 ) • The D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e n 
e x c l u d e d , b a s e d upon p r i v i l e g e , t e s t i m o n y by t h e B i s h o p a s 
t o the D e c e d e n t ' s c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s e x p l a n a t i o n o f h i s c o n d u c t 
( R . 5 2 1 ) . I t was admitted a t T r i a l t h a t the B i s h o p ' s o b s e r v a t i o n 
and c o n v e r s a t i o n wi th the Decedent occurred d u r i n g t h e r e g u l a r 
c o u r s e o f h i s e c c l e s i a s t i c a l d u t i e s (R. 5 1 4 ) . T h e r e f o r e , 
such t e s t imony should have been exc luded pursuant t o Utah Code 
Annotated S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 4 - 8 ( 3 ) . 
A p p e l l a n t s u b m i t s t h a t t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s made by t h e 
D e c e d e n t ' s Bishop c o n s t i t u t e d p r i v i l e g e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s under 
Utah Law. The B i s h o p ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s in the p r e s e n t c a s e were not 
a c c i d e n t a l , but were made s p e c i f i c a l l y in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h h i s 
e c c l e s i a s t i c a l d u t i e s . The Bishop was c o n t a c t e d because of h i s 
p r o f e s s i o n a l s t a t u s and r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e D e c e d e n t (R. 519) , 
and made h i s o b s e r v a t i o n s d i r e c t l y as a r e s u l t t h e r e o f . 
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The s c o p e o f t h e c l e r i c a l p r i v i l e g e i s n o t d e f i n e d by 
the medium of communicat ion, but by whether t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e 
communication i s p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h i n the realm of e c c l e s i a s t i c a l 
c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y . J o n e s v . Department of Human R e s o u r c e s , 310 
S.E.2d 753 (Ga. App. 1 9 8 3 ) . 
A s s u m i n g , a r g u e n d o , t h a t t h e B i s h o p ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s were 
p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d , i t was e r r o r t o d i s a l l o w t h e B i s h o p ' s 
t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g t h e D e c e d e n t ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Such r u l i n g was i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e T r i a l 
C o u r t ' s admiss ion of the B i s h o p ' s o b s e r v a t i o n s , and was u n f a i r l y 
p r e j u d i c i a l t o A p p e l l a n t , s i n c e i t c r e a t e d an u n r e b u t t e d 
i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e D e c e d e n t had e n g a g e d in an e x t r a - m a r i t a l 
a f f a i r . Wirtanen v . P r u d e n t i a l I n s . Co. of America. 183 N.W.2d 
456 (Mich. App. 1 9 7 1 ) . 
POINT VI . 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
CROSS EXAMINATION CONCERNING HYPNOTIC 
ENHANCEMENT OF RESPONDENTS' TESTIMONY 
The T r i a l Court d i s a l l o w e d c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n as t o whether 
R e s p o n d e n t L o w e ' s t e s t i m o n y was enhanced t h r o u g h h y p n o s i s 
(R. 440 , 4 4 2 ) . The Utah Supreme Court has r e c e n t l y prov ided an 
e x t e n s i v e o p i n i o n on t h e s u b j e c t o f h y p n o t i c a l l y - e n h a n c e d 
t e s t i m o n y . S t a t e v . T u t t l e , 106 UAR 6 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) . In T u t t l e 
the Utah Supreme Court ru led t h a t h y p n o t i c a l l y - e n h a n c e d t e s t i m o n y 
i s i n a d m i s s i b l e in c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s . Par t of the C o u r t ' s 
r a t i o n a l e for e x c l u d i n g s u c h t e s t i m o n y was t h e d a n g e r t h a t a 
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hypnotically-enhanced witness may "recall" things that never 
occurred. Tuttle at 8, Note 6. Inquiry into whether a witness' 
testimony has been hypnotically enhanced should also be allowed 
in civil proceedings for the purpose of challenging the witness1 
recollection and credibility. Spryncznatyk v. General Motors 
Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985). 
In the p r e s e n t c a s e , the p o s s i b i l i t y of hypnot i c i n f l u e n c e 
was i n d i c a t e d by Lowe ' s u n u s u a l l y p r e c i s e r e c o l l e c t i o n a s t o 
c e r t a i n d e t a i l s , such as the d a t e of her c o n v e r s a t i o n wi th the 
D e c e d e n t (R. 2 5 1 - 2 5 2 ) , 2 t h e s e a t i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s d u r i n g t h e 
c o n v e r s a t i o n (R. 2 5 5 - 2 5 6 ) , and t h e D e c e d e n t ' s s e l e c t i o n o f a 
w r i t i n g implement (R. 2 5 7 ) . A p p e l l a n t should have been a l lowed 
t o f u l l y e x p l o r e Lowe's r e c o l l e c t i o n of the a l l e g e d c o n v e r s a t i o n . 
POINT V I I . 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS CONTRARY TO THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
In rev i ewing a t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s , based upon e x t r i n s i c 
e v i d e n c e a s t o t h e i n t e n t o f t h e p a r t i e s t o an ambiguous 
c o n t r a c t , the Court of Appeals a p p l i e s the " c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s " 
standard of r e v i e w . Proper ty A s s i s t a n c e C o r p . . 768 P.2d a t 978; 
Crowther v . C a r t e r . 767 P.2d 129 (Ut . App. 1 9 8 9 ) . F i n d i n g s of 
F a c t a r e c l e a r l y erroneous i f the a p p e l l a n t can show t h a t they 
2 L o w e ' s t e s t i m o n y c o n t a i n s no r e f e r e n c e t o A p p e l l a n t ' s 
d a t i n g o f t h e e n r o l l m e n t form (R. 2 8 ) . T h u s , t h e r e i s no 
i n d i c a t i o n of how Lowe r e c a l l e d the s p e c i f i c d a t e . 
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are against the c l ear weight of the evidence or that they induce 
a d e f i n i t e and firm c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a mis take has been made. 
Maughn v. Mauahn. 102 UAR 44 (Ut. App. 1989) . Western Kane Cty 
S p e c i a l S e r v . D i s t . No, 1 v . Jackson Cat t l e Co. , 744 P.2d 1376 
(Ut. 1987) . 
The f a c t u a l s u f f i c i e n c y of the T r i a l C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s 
depends to some extent upon the propriety of i t s ru l ings on the 
ev ident iary i s sues and i t s appl icat ion of the appropriate l e g a l 
standards. The only ev ident iary support for the T r i a l C o u r t ' s 
c o n c l u s i o n as to the D e c e d e n t ' s i n t e n t was the Respondents ' 
hearsay t e s t i m o n y . 3 i f f as A p p e l l a n t s u b m i t s , such evidence 
should have been excluded, the Tria l Court's conclusion as to the 
Decedent's intent was without ev ident iary support. 
However, even assuming t h a t the T r i a l C o u r t ' s method of 
ana lys i s and ev ident iary ru l ings were c o r r e c t , i t s determination 
was contrary to the ev idence . The circumstances which ex i s t ed at 
the time of the D e c e d e n t ' s e x e c u t i o n of the e n r o l l m e n t form 
overwhelmingly indicate that the primary purpose of the p o l i c y 
was to provide for the Appel lant ' s maintenance in the event of 
the Decedent's death. At the re levant t ime, the Appellant was in 
3 The Tria l Court a l so apparently construed the des ignat ion 
of benef ic iary in favor of Respondents. However, construct ion of 
the b e n e f i c i a r y c l a u s e i s p u r e l y an i s s u e of law. Appellant 
s u b m i t s t h a t t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of b e n e f i c i a r y i s f a c i a l l y 
ambiguous, and supports Appel lant ' s p o s i t i o n at l e a s t as wel l as 
Respondents. 
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ill health, had been unable to work for a number of years, and 
owed approximately Twenty-seven Thousand Dollars ($27,000.00) on 
the family home. The Decedent and Appellant had no other life 
insurance coverage, or any other savings or investments. Two of 
the Respondents were living at home and being supported by the 
Appellant, the others having become emancipated and financially 
independent. The beneficiary designation at issue was written by 
the Appellant, during a conversation with the Decedent, wherein 
the Decedent told Appellant that she was the beneficiary, and 
that the purpose of the insurance coverage was to provide for the 
Appellant so that she would not have to be a burden upon anyone 
(R. 78, 85) . Considering the amount of the insurance coverage at 
the time of execution of the enrollment form, and the fact that 
any funeral costs would have to be paid by the Appellant 
(R. 285) , the Decedent could not have intended to divide the 
proceeds equally among Appellant and the Respondents and still 
have provided some measure of security for Appellant. The Trial 
Court should have considered these circumstances in determining 
the Decedent's intent. Standard Life Insurance Company of the 
South v. Franks, 260 So.2d 365 (La. App. 1972). 
Respondents' attempt to impeach Appellantfs stated meaning 
of the dash only proved that Appellant's stated meaning was 
consistent with her customary use of dashes (R. 347-359). For 
example, in one instance, Appellant used a dash to distinguish 
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between an attorney and his secretary (R. 352) ,, which is a 
superior/subordinate relationship, similar to that of primary and 
contingent beneficiaries. Further, the enrollment form contained 
no other means by which to designate a contingent beneficiary. 
Respondents1 only supporting evidence is their hearsay 
testimony, much of which does not clearly relate to the disputed 
issue in this case, and all of which is self-serving and came to 
light only after the present dispute arose (R. 404). By 
contrast, Appellant's reaction to the perceived mistake of the 
insurance company was immediate and unequivocal (R. 618) . 
The testimony of Virginia Lowe was intrinsically improbable, 
due to the witness' failure to adequately explain Appellant's 
participation in filling out the enrollment form, or the presence 
of the dash. Further, Lowe's testimony was inconsistent inasmuch 
as, according to Lowe, Appellant was to bear the full cost of any 
funeral expenses (R. 285), which is contrary to the Decedent's 
alleged statement that Appellant and Respondents were to share 
"equally" and "fairly" (R. 432) . Since the amount of insurance 
at the time was only Thirty-one Thousand Dollars ($31,000.00), 
such an arrangement would leave Appellant with no support from 
the insurance proceeds. The record does not indicate that the 
Decedent intended to leave Appellant with no support whatsoever 
after his death. 
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Furthermore, Lowe's testimony was discredited. Appellant 
testified that Lowe was not present at the time that the 
enrollment form was executed (R. 69, 73) . Appellant and Arnold 
Bigler testified that Lowe engaged in a telephone conversation 
with the Appellant concerning insurance at roughly the same time 
that the form was executed (R. 594-596, 635). The evidence 
indicated that Lowefs purported reason for being at Appellant's 
home on the date in question was untenable.^ Further, Lowe made 
no mention of her alleged conversation with the Decedent until 
long after the present dispute arose (R. 467-468). Although the 
Court of Appeals generally defers to the Trial Court on questions 
of credibility. State v. Grueber. 110 DAR 29 (Utah 1989), the 
Court of Appeals need not accept testimony which is patently 
unbelievable. Estate of Baker. 182 Cal.Rptr. 550 (1982). 
4 Lowe testified that her reason for visiting her parents on 
October 28, 1978 was "to show my mother how to sew a certain kind 
of jacket for a company I was working for." (R. 277). Lowe 
further testified that, at the time of her alleged conversation 
with the Decedent, the coats were not completed, or even "90 
percent completed" (R. 280), but had barely been started 
(R. 278-279). However, Appellant testified that she started work 
on the coats in June of 1978 (R. 632) , and this fact was 
uncontested (R. 280). Both Appellant and Lowe testified that it 
took approximately three months to complete the coats (R. 633, 
279). Therefore, the coats must have been nearly completed, if 
not completed, by October 28, 1978, and Appellant clearly did not 
need Lowe to show her how to sew the coats. This point is 
verified by the fact that Appellant received payment for the 
coats on or about November 6, 1978. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, 
received at R. 63.) Appellant testified that she received such 
payment approximately two weeks after the coats were turned in 
(R. 360), and this fact was undisputed (R. 279) . 
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In this case the Trial Court has made no express determination as 
to credibility, and may not have considered that issue, based 
upon its construction of the enrollment form. Under these 
circumstances, the Court of Appeals should consider the quality 
of the testimony in assessing the weight on the evidence. 
Even crediting all of the evidence produced by Respondents, 
the Trial Court's decision in this case was against the clear 
weight of the evidence, in view of the undisputed evidence 
concerning the surrounding circumstances at the time of execution 
of the enrollment form and Appellant's participation in filling 
out the enrollment form. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests that this Honorable Court reverse the 
findings and Judgment of the Trial Court and remand this case to 
the District Court for entry of Judgment in favor of Appellant 
and against the Respondents for the entire amount of the 
insurance proceeds which are on deposit in the Trial Court. 
DATED this day of September, 1989. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
David H. 
Mark C. McLachlan 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t c o p y o f t h e 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EVELYN A. MUIR, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
AMEX LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation, 
SANDRA M. JENKINS; LINDA J. 
MUIR; VIRGINIA M. LOWE; 
DEANNE M. PFEIFFER; and 
MARK W. MUIR, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, AND ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C87-1330 
JUDGE 
The above-captioned matter was tried before this Court 
on January 17th, 18th, 19th and 24th, 1989. The Court having 
heard the witnesses and arguments of counsel, and having reviewed 
the parties' Trial Briefs, hereby enters these Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Evelyn A. Muir and Wallace A. Muir were married 
April 26, 1947. 
2. During the course of the marriage of Evelyn and 
Wallace Muir, Sandra, Linda and Virginia were born as natural 
issue and Deanna and Mark were adopted* 
3. On October 28, 1978, Wallace Muir enrolled in a 
credit union accident insurance policy. By enrolling in this 
policy, Wallace elected to secure and purchase accidental death 
coverage in the amount of $30,000.00. 
4. Wallace's membership in the credit union allowed 
for an additional $1,000.00 of accidental life insurance without 
charge. 
5. On the credit union accident insurance enrollment 
form, in the space provided for "Member's beneficiary", Wallace 
designated "Evelyn-Sandra Linda Ginny Deanna Mark." In the 
space provided for "relationship", Wallace designated "wife and 
children". 
2 
6. The writing of Evelyn Muir, who acted as scribe 
for Wallace Muir, appears on the insurance enrollment form. 
7. Wallace Muir signed the insurance enrollment form 
on October 28, 1978. 
8. On December 26f 1984 Wallace elected to increase 
the accident insurance policy from $30,000,00 to $150,000.00. 
9. Wallace Muir died by accidental cause on September 
6, 1986. 
10. Amex Life Assurance Company, the underwriter for 
the credit union accident insurance policy, tendered the proceeds 
of the policy to the Court and these proceeds are on deposit with 
the Court. 
11. Wallace A. Muir designated his beneficiaries under 
the credit union accident insurance policy to be Evelyn A. Muir, 
his wife, and Sandra M. Jenkins, Linda J. Muir, Virginia M. Lowe, 
Deanna M. Pfeiffer, and Mark W. Muir, his children, to share in 
the proceeds of the policy equally. 
3 
12. As proven by a preponderance of the evidence and 
based on the testimony presented at trial and the document 
itself, Wallace Muir intended to leave the proceeds of this 
insurance policy to Evelyn, Sandra, Linda, Ginny,* Deanna and 
Mark, equally, each sharing 1/6 of the proceeds together with any 
interest that has accrued thereon. 
CONCLUSIONS. OF LAW 
1. An insurance policy is a contract between the 
insurer an<l the insured, in this case Amex Life Assurance 
Company and ' llace A, Muir, respectively. 
2. lased on the Findings of Facts and the insurance 
contract, the C rt concludes that Wallace Muir intended to leave 
the proceeds of >. * insurance policy to his wife and children, 
each sharing equal. 
QR 3ER_ OF JUDGMENT 
Based on the foi oing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, the Court orders as allows: 
1. The insurance pro , •; on deposit with the Court 
together with any interest that s^ accrued thereon shall be 
disbursed among the beneficiaries, div >d equally among them. 
4 
2. The following benef ic ia r ies sihall each receive 
l / 6 t h of t h e i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s : 
Eve lyn A. Muir 
Sandra M. J e n k i n s 
L inda J . Muir 
V i r g i n i a W. Lowe 
Deanne M. P f e i f f e r 
Mark W. Muir 
The s h a r e s of t h e i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s s h a l l be p a i d t o 
t h e i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i e s and t o t h e t r u s t a c c c o u n t s of t h e i r 
r e s p e c t i v e c o u n s e l • 
3 . The JDefendapts a r e awarded c o s t s ; Theac *co3t3 
srfe-sifc-ber •gggjgf^E^xraTTi th.o s h a r e — ^ i — p r o o e e d o — p a y a b l e — f e Q -tbo ri*s^=~»e>-yLeauG^evtcKLrxm .rn.o •• i n a r o — ^ £ — p r o o o a a o pay stoic—fro ^ a o 
DATED t h i s /* " day of / % * ^ t , 1 9 8 9 . 
BY Tift £C$URT 
>7 
RIGTRUP fl 7 
5 






560 South 300 East 
PO Box 45420 
Salt Lake City Utah 84145-0420 
August 8, 1990 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
FILED 
AUG t 5 1990 
COURT OF APPEALS 
RE: Kenneth L. Virgin v. Stateline Chevron, and/or Workers 
Compensation Fund, and Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
Case No.: 900167-CA 
Priority No. 7 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
On July 23, 1990 I filed the Brief of Respondent on behalf of the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah in the above-captioned case. 
It has just been brought to my attention that the last sentence of Page 8 
does not connect to the first sentence on Page 9. In reviewing this matter I 
note that an omission occurred that I failed to catch in my final proof 
reading of the Brief. I apologize for this error. Will you please note the 
last sentence of Page 8 should read: 
A change from an asymptomatic condition to a symptomatic 
condition does not prove the injury accelerated the 
deterioration of the previous condition. 
The first sentence of Page 9 should read: 
So far as is known, the acute effects of this injury 
subsided very rapidly and the Applicant experienced no 
significant problems for two to three months after the 
accident. 
I apologize for this error and the inconvenience caused the Court by my 
oversight. I would appreciate your inserting this letter of explanation 
between pages 8 and 9 of our Brief. 
Again, we apologize for this inconvenience to the Court. 
Very truly yours, 
WORKERS CQMPEtiSATION FUND 
RGS/jm 
Ridiard G. Sumsion 
Attorney for Respondent 
538-8149 
UdJH 
e-^i ' • SUA 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a/Copy of the foregoing Letter of Correction to the 
following parties this ///^day of August, 1990 by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid: 
LeRoy K. Johnson 
311 South State Street, #380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James E. Harward, Director 
Division of Legal Affairs 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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